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CASENOTES AND COMMENTS
If the rule of corroboration in divorce cases has these two
alternative policies it would seem that the one to emphasize
in the separate maintenance cases is the one involving the
danger that is likely to be present, i. e., a trumped up
charge, rather than the one involving a danger impossible
of being involved, viz., collusion.
Thus it would seem that, rather than to grant relief to
the wife on but slight corroboration, as the Heinmuller,
Engelberth and Roeder cases permit, or to require no cor-
roboration, as does the Wiegand case, the rule should be to
give full and vigorous effect to the statement in the Silver-
berg case, standing alone, and to require corroboration to
the utmost, in view of the fact that one of the two dangers
sought to be avoided by the rule is present in separate main-
tenance cases as much as is ever likely. If the requirement
of corroboration is generally sound it would seem appro-
priate to demand it to the utmost in separate maintenance
cases where collusion is entirely unlikely but where moti-
vated false accusations are very likely. It does not dispose
of the problem to repeat the shibboleth, appropriate enough
for divorce cases as such, that if the nature of the case pre-
cludes collusion the corroboration need be but slight. There
is more to the problem than the danger of collusion.
FURTHER CONCERNING THE DOUBLE LIABILITY
OF BANK STOCKHOLDERS. STOCKHOLDERS
OF PEOPLE'S BANKING CO. V. STERLING
(GHINGHER V. BACHTELL)'
In a case' previously noted in the REVIEW8 the Court of
Appeals of Maryland reversed the trial court and held it
proper to assess "double liability" against bank stock-
holders for debts of the bank incurred prior to their becom-
ing owners of the stock. The stockholders appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States alleging that the applic-
able statute, as interpreted by the Maryland Court, im-
1 57 S. Ct. 386 (1937). The companion case of Stockholders of Hagers-
town Bank and Trust Co. v. Sterling was decided in the same opinion.
9 Ghingher v. Bachtell, 169 Md. 678, 182 Atl. 558 (sub nom. Ghingher v.
Stockholders of People's Banking Co.) (1936). The companion case in the
Maryland Court of Appeals was Ghingher v. Kausler, 169 Md. 696, 182 Atl.
566 (sub norm. Ghingher v. Stockholders of Hagerstown Bank and Trust
Co.) (1936).8 Note, Double Liability of a bank stockholder for a debt of the bank in-
curred before his ownership of the stock (1936) 1 Md. L. Rev. 95.
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paired the obligation of contracts previously made and'was,
therefore, unconstitutional. Held: Affirmed. The provision
of the Maryland Constitution was of itself effective to im-
pose double liability on bank stockholders but it did not take
from the legislature (or in the absence of any statute, from
the courts) the power to provide statutory remedies or
means of enforcing the constitutional provision. The pre-
vious statutory method of enforcement provided did not
exhaust the power of the legislature over the matter. The
later Maryland statutes proceeded under do not impair the
obligations of any contract with the stockholders despite
the fact that the statutes in force at the time they became
stockholders permitted only an action by the creditors,
against only those stockholders who were such when the
debt was created, and subject to set-off and counterclaim,
whereas the subsequently enacted statutes permitted an
action by the receiver, against all stockholders regardless
of when they became such, and without offsets and counter-
claims. It was pointed out that it would not impair the con-
tract for the State Court to give a new meaning to the
previously existing provision of the State constitution, so
long as the new meaning was the product of the independent
judgment of the Court and not adopted because the later
statute required it. It was further pointed out that the
statute in force at the time the stockholders became such
provided that it should be subject to repeal or alteration
and that even if the statutes should be unconstitutional the
burden would be on the stockholders to show (which they
had not done) that any of the debts sought to be enforced
existed before the later statute took effect. It was also
pointed out that all the stockholders in the second case
acquired their shares after the enactment of the latest
statute regulating the double liability.
The Court pointed out that the enumerated changes in
the laws governing the enforcement of the double liability
did not impair the obligations of contracts, first, because the
changes were directed toward the implementing remedies,
and, second, because of the reserved power of alteration or
repeal. It was pointed out that the first remedy provided
(suit by creditor against stockholder) proved to be unwork-
able and that subsequently the Maryland Legislature pro-
vided another remedy which was less unwieldy and con-
fusing (collection by the receiver for the benefit of the
assets of the closed bank). This was merely the substitution
of another remedy for the same substantive liability.
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The Court pointed out, for that matter, that the reserved
power of alteration or repeal would have even permitted a
subsequent enlargement of the substantive liability of the
stockholders. It was also pointed out that the double lia-
bility provision of the Maryland Constitution was a mini-
mum, and not a maximum, liability and did not prevent the
legislature from setting up a more onerous form of liability
of its own force.
The Court distinguished a case much relied on by the
appellants by pointing out that in that case creditors were
complaining of the destruction of a cause of action, whereas
in the principal case the debtors were complaining. It was
pointed out that there was not even any proof that any
creditors would be damaged by the changes and it was
further suggested that, in the ordinary course of business
(under the "first in, first out" rule) it was highly improb-
able that there remained any creditors of the banks whose
deposits were made prior to the statutory changes of 1910
and not yet withdrawn.
It is interesting to note that the opinion in the case in the
Court of Appeals of Maryland dealt more with the question
whether the "double liability" could be assessed for a debt
incurred before the stockholder acquired his stock while that
in the Supreme Court of the United States devoted itself to
the matter of the constitutionality of the change of the
method of enforcing the double liability. Almost all of the
stockholders in one case, and all in the other, became such
after the latest change was made in 1910. Apparently those
who had become stockholders after 1910 were relying on the
point that the whole statute was unconstitutional because of
the effect it had on those who were already stockholders
when it was passed. As the Court pointed out, a ruling
against those who became stockholders before 1910 was all
the more one against those who became so subsequently.
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